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Sarasota News Leader February 15, 2013 OPINION Page 66 2.In the face of no organized indigenous opposition, other than the Taliban, the U.S. has no option other than to maintain the Karzai government in power. The Karzai kleptocracy is the Tar Baby which the U.S. has willingly embraced for more than a decade. to read and write at the first-grade level. Later that same year, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Peter Fuller, commander of NATO���s training mission in Afghanistan, was relieved of his duties after stating publicly that the Afghan leadership is ���isolated from reality��� with respect to ANSF troops��� combat readiness. 3.No prospect for a political settlement likely exists. All realistic chances of a political settlement with the Taliban ended with the assassination by the Taliban on Sept. 20, 2011 of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former Afghan president who was then serving as the head of the High Peace Council. That council sought to facilitate a political accommodation between the Karzai government and the Taliban. Fuller���s comments were not far off the mark. In April 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that 7 percent of Afghan army and 9 percent of police units were rated at ���highest level of capability,��� which is defined as ���independent with advisors.��� This means that NATO troops still had to lead the ANSF. This is a significant change from the earlier Pentagon rating of ���independent,��� which meant that ANSF units were able to operate at a level of NATO troops. Although touted as the main bulwark against the Taliban, the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is neither a cohesive nor committed fighting force. It has a theoretical strength of 352,000, but according to NATO statistics, nearly 15 percent deserted during the first half of 2012. Desertion is not a punishable offense under current Afghan law. A report to Congress issued earlier this week by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues, February, 2013) noted that the tests measuring ANSF capabilities have changed several times and criteria for validating effectiveness have been eliminated, thereby allowing more ANSF units to be rated at the highest level. Simply Continuing training of the ANSF will be the put, standards measuring training outcomes principal function of U.S. troops post-2014. were dumbed down. The ability of the ANSF to receive training forces is limited, in part, by its troops��� lev- The GAO also addressed the cost of sustainel of literacy. In May 2011, the International ing the ANSF during the period of Fiscal Year Security Assistance Force Training Mission 2013 through FY 2017. It estimated those costs estimated that by January 2012, only half of at $25 billion. The Afghan government has the Afghan military personnel would be able insufficient financial resources to pay these